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Public Pensions and the Promise of Shareholder Activism for the Next Frontier of Corporate Governance: Sustainable Economic Development 1 Introduction
The Wall Street Journal recently reported that 2006 saw the concept of shareholder democracy return "with a vengeance." 2 The most talked about development was the push to allow shareholders to directly nominate candidates for the board of directors.
3 Increased shareholder power was also seen in the reinvigoration and success of shareholder proposals since the corporate scandals of Enron, WorldCom, and others in [2001] [2002] . 4 For example, proposals on board declassification have received such strong support from shareholders 5 that the CEO of proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) now advises corporations not to even attempt to fight these proposals. 6 Not only are shareholders' uses of their powers generally expanding, but their concept of what is a legitimate corporate governance issue is also expanding. Although still subject to much debate and controversy, governance no longer only includes traditional issues of CEO compensation, board structure, and anti-takeover devices, but also includes so-called non-financial criteria, 7 or in other words, sustainability. 8 Thus, for many investors, governance issues are transforming into "Environmental, Social, and Governance" (ESG) issues. The basis of the ESG movement is less about the values investing commonly associated with the socially responsible investing (SRI) funds, and more about long-term value investing focused on reduced risk and improved shareholder value. 9 Just as 2006 may be seen as a breakout year for corporate governance activism, it was also the year for ESG issues. Shareholders sponsoring proposals on social and environmental issues enjoyed their most successful year to-date. 10 This success coincided with the increased visibility of the importance of nonfinancial matters to some shareholders. For 9 See THE GLOBAL COMPACT, WHO CARES WHO WINS: CONNECTING FINANCIAL MARKETS TO A CHANGING WORLD i (2004), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Issues/financial_markets/who_cares_who_wins.pdf (stating that corporations with better performance on ESG issues can "increase shareholder value by, for example, properly managing risks, anticipating regulatory action or accessing new markets, while at the same time contributing to the sustainable development of the societies in which they operate. Moreover, these issues can have a strong impact on reputation and brands, an increasingly important part of company value."); ONVALUES INVESTMENT STRATEGIES AND RESEARCH LTD., CONFERENCE REPORT: INVESTING FOR LONG-TERM VALUE: INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE VALUE DRIVERS IN ASSET MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL RESEARCH 2 (2005), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Issues/financial_markets/zurich_rep.pdf (reporting the outcomes from a conference attended by members of various major financial institutions and finding that "There was a remarkable degree of agreement among participants that ESG factors play an important role in the context of longer-term investment strategies and that the financial industry must improve their consideration in research and investment processes."). With respect to risk, some point out that many of the "really big discontinuous shifts in share price" are due to issues related to a firm's social performance. Raj Thamotheram, A Critical Perspective on Activism: Views From a Pension Professional, in RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 295, 299 (Rory Sullivan and Craig Mackensie, eds., 2006). For a framework for understanding the tensions between short-term results and long-term growth and how managers must stop viewing sustainability as a "one-dimensional nuisance" but as a "multidimensional opportunity," see generally Hart & Milstein, supra note 8.
Investment by ringing the opening bell at the New York Stock Exchange.
11 These principles require investors to consider ESG issues in their investment analysis and decision-making, to be active owners-including voting on proposals and engaging with corporations-and to press for consideration of ESG issues throughout the financial industry. 12 For others, the increased profile of climate change issues has also increased its importance to investors. 13 Also in 2006, both the Conference Board and the Business Roundtable's Institute for Corporate Ethics issued reports detailing the harms of the stock market's short-term focus and urging that action be taken to refocus corporations on the long-term.
14 Krehmeyer and colleagues define short-termism as an "excessive focus of some corporate leaders, investors, and analysts on short-term, quarterly earnings and a lack of attention to the strategy, fundamentals, and conventional approaches to long-term value creation." 15 Although commentators have discussed the problem of short-termism since the early 1980s, the issue is receiving priority again due to the scandals of [2001] [2002] showing its harmful effects and, more importantly for purposes of this article, the greater recognition given to the potential positive impact of ESG factors on long-term performance. 16 In other words, sustainable economic development is receiving greater recognition as an issue of long-term shareholder value. 17 These issues come together under the term "long-term responsible investing" (LTRI). 228, February 2007 , at 2 (noting the increased "frequency, pace, and profile" of climate change-related actions coming from the media, governments (state, local and national), the scientific community, financial institutions, and corporations).
Heavily involved in all of these developments are public pension funds. These state and local government pensions collectively control approximately 10 percent of the US equity market. 19 Many legal scholars envisioned a positive role for these institutional investors as monitors of corporate management and encouraged reforms to strengthen their "shareholder voice." 20 Public pensions were singled out for this role due to their lack of a commercial relationship with corporate management that could create a conflict of interest, 21 and later for their long-term, economy-wide interests. 22 Some commentators cited public pensions for the recent success of social and environmental proposals. 23 Others, however, are leery of granting these institutional investors additional power. These critics argue that public pension funds will use any increased powers to take actions based on the private interests of politicians or special interest groups and not based on serving the best interests of the corporation and other shareholders. (2005) . The LTRI term seems to best capture the investment interests of public pension funds. Alternatively, the term "sustainable development investing" (SDI) also serves this purpose. 19 This article brings together these developments in shareholder activism and the "next frontier" of corporate governance 26 -that is, the environmental and social aspects of the expanded definition of corporate governance-to explore the role of public pensions under a "new governance" regulatory approach focused on sustainable economic development. As recognized over 30 years ago by Christopher Stone, 27 traditional legal mechanisms have significant limits in regulating corporate behavior related to environmental and social performance.
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In response, there is a movement towards utilizing more decentralized regulatory mechanisms that are part of a "new governance" approach. 29 These changes are most pronounced in environmental regulation, where regulators recognize the limits of command-and-control regulation and seek to utilize flexible, innovative approaches. 30 In this article, I argue that public pension funds-even with the criticisms leveled at them mentioned briefly earlier-have the potential to serve a valuable role in this new regulatory approach.
This article proceeds by describing new governance regulation, including why such an approach is necessary for sustainable economic development issues, and then discussing a role for public pensions under such an approach. The next part takes a look what public pensions are currently doing in the area of LTRI. I find that although some funds are making progress, overall their actions are limited and may actually be contributing to the short-termism problem. The following part proposes that public pensions should be required to disclose how, if at all, they incorporate LTRI issues into their investment policy and how that 25 policy is implemented. This proposal is based on a UK law that went into effect in 2000. This part also considers the response of UK pensions to that requirement and discusses the expected benefits of such a law in the US. In addition, I discuss what other pension fund governance reforms may be necessary to ensure the success of the law.
New Governance Regulation and Long-Term Responsible Investment
The regulatory goal that I address in this paper is to ensure that corporations are focused on long-term value creation through sustainable economic development. At a general level, this is not a controversial goal. For example, Delaware Vice-Chancellor Leo Strine, Jr states that elected government officials of both parties and "most individual investors":
. . . do not see corporations as having solely the social purpose of benefiting investors as investors. Rather, they understand and embrace the historical reality that the corporate form was authorized as an instrumental means of enhancing the well-being of our society as a whole and not simply as a means to make investors rich and immune from liability for corporate acts. Although many traditionalist policymakers would concede that making managers more directly accountable to stockholders is a useful means to achieve the larger objective of increasing societal wealth, they do not conflate the goal of a durably wealthier society with the short-term interests of investors in higher stock prices. Indeed, they are concerned that tilting the direction of corporate policy toward short-term thinking is counterproductive, not simply for investors but for other important constituencies such as employees and communities. 31 With respect to the failures of long-term value, Tonello states that an "excessive focus on quarterly results, scarce attention to value-creation strategies, and failure to probe deeply enough into long-term performance are believed to be 31 Strine, supra note 25, at 1769. Strine goes on to state "Existing American corporate law bears out the popularity of these traditionalist views. Most U.S. states permit corporate directors to consider the interests of constituencies other than stockholders. Even Delaware law has long made clear that directors have wide leeway to pursue the course of action they believe in good faith to be in the longterm best interests of stockholders, even if that means forsaking other tactics that might increase stock value in the short term." (footnotes omitted). Id. While commenting that it is uncontroversial to state that regulatory policy should ensure a focus on the long-term, SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson stated "I realize that speaking out on the need for a longer-term approach to investment analysis is akin to speaking out in favor of baseball, hot dogs, and apple pie -it's something (almost) everyone supports, in an abstract way. leading to a kind of 'short-termism' which damages market credibility and depresses today's economic development." 32 A clear example of this problem comes from a recent survey of over 300 public corporation financial executives that found that 80 percent of these respondents would decrease discretionary spending in such areas as research-and-development and plant maintenance in order to meet quarterly earnings targets. 33 The researchers also found that managers would often reject positive net present value projects if it meant missing their earnings targets for the current quarter.
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This short-termism not only leads to scandals such as Enron, 35 but also causes unsustainable economic development. 36 Sustainable development is commonly defined as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."
37 Rather than seeking to halt development, sustainable development recognizes that economic growth is necessary to meet the "needs and aspirations" of the present, as well as future generations. 38 However, principles of equity and environmental protection must guide that development. Some corporations are attempting to put these principles of economic prosperity, environmental integrity, and social equity, into action through value creation, environmental management, and corporate social responsibility. 40 External pressures, such as the short-term pressures from investors and analysts, may impede these corporations efforts to implement those principles. Some investors, however, do not see environmental management and corporate social responsibility as being in conflict with long-term value creation, but as necessary components of it. 41 These beliefs are bolstered by research showing that there is a positive relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP). 42 Investing on such beliefs is distinct from an investment approach that incorporates ESG issues into investment decision making based on moral judgment of a corporation's actions. 43 43 See infra note 87 and accompanying text (distinguishing long-term investing and universal ownership from some forms of socially responsible investing). 44 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 45 In general, there seems to be a trend away from using the word "ethical", as was used in the acronym SEE (social, ethical and environmental up negative connotations. As an example, the executive director of one large public pension fund informed me that the SRI term "terrifies" the fund's trustees, but the trustees are apparently comfortable with many of the ideas behind SRI, as they approve initiatives on sustainability and governance that avoid the use of that term. 46 What "terrifies" those trustees, seems to horrify those that critique this movement.
Many argue that corporate management should follow only the basic mandates of the law and they should not cede to the demands of investor groups that pressure companies to exceed the basic requirements of the law, as that would be engaging in inappropriate political action. 47 This argument, however, inappropriately assumes two things. First, it assumes that the investors applying the pressure are acting from self-interested political beliefs rather than a belief that higher social and environmental performance will improve long-run performance. Second, it assumes that the law is an effective and efficient regulator of corporate behavior related to sustainable development. In this paper, I focus on the latter false assumption as motivation for my proposal, but the implementation of that proposal draws on the first.
Traditional legal mechanisms
48 have significant limits when attempting to regulate the issues that relate to a firm's environmental and social performance. Although traditional regulation has clearly improved corporate behavior, it has reached its limits in many ways. 49 These failings have been well-documented elsewhere and include arguments of inefficiency, over-regulation, normative legitimacy, delay in responding to new harms or changing societal expectations, enforcement issues, and being limited to focusing on compliance with minimum standards rather than encouraging corporations to seek higher standards that are within their capabilities and resource constraints. 50 Overall, traditional regulation and "Well you see you are OK if you stay with a phrase like "Socially responsible" and never introduce the word "ethics"!"). 46 Executive director response to a pension fund survey described infra Part III.2. Due to these limitations, regulators have sought out new regulatory approaches to complement traditional legal approaches. This movement away from command-and-control regulation and towards a "second generation" approach has been gaining significant momentum in environmental regulation, 52 as well as in such areas as occupational health and safety, 53 food safety, 54 and employment discrimination. 55 In general, this second generation approach may be referred to as "new governance" regulation.
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As the name suggests, when applied to corporations, new governance regulation focuses less on directly regulating corporate behavior-such as through traditional command-and-control models-and more on influencing the governance of corporations. Although new governance scholarship is not based in a single socio-legal theory, Lobel has identified commonalities in implementation. First, this approach is participatory 460-66 (1996) (arguing that environmental regulation suffers from "three major structural defects: fragmentation by medium, statutory overregulation, and agency confrontation"); Karkkainen, Default Rules, supra note 30, at 862 (arguing that environmental regulation is "often costly to implement, inflexible, insensitive to local variations in the economic costs and environmental benefits associated with achieving a specified level of environmental performance, and, in some circumstances, they may stifle innovation"). in that there is a role for all sectors of society (state, market, and civil) at all stages of regulation, from the development of standards to enforcement. 57 Multiple actors are encouraged to work together to identify common values and goals, and seek consensus rather than focus on "a winner-takes-all approach."
58 Following from this participatory approach, new governance regulation is decentralized, which promotes experimentation and utilization of local knowledge. 59 This also permits meaningful deliberation between the interested actors 60 and encourages a system that is continually updated based on new knowledge. 61 Finally, these regulatory initiatives may cut across multiple policy domains. 62 A general category of a new governance approach directed towards investors (and others) for the purpose of improving corporate sustainability is the disclosure of information related a firm's performance on environmental and social issues. 63 One such example is the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. 64 The TRI requires companies in certain industries to publicly disclose their plants' emissions of listed pollutants. 65 A second example is sustainability reporting. These are annual reports published by corporations and available to the public that disclose information on the firm's entire economic, environmental, and social performance. In contrast to the TRI, sustainability reporting is voluntary in the United States. 66 In addition, the information reported is not standardized and is 57 Lobel, supra note 56, at 371-76 58 Id. at 376-79. Negotiated rulemaking is an example of an attempt to achieve collaboration. Id. at 377. 59 Id. at 381-383. 60 Id. at 384. 61 Id. at 395-400. 62 Id. at 385-87. often qualitative. 67 The primary attempt to develop standards for these reports is the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), 68 whose standards are used by over 1,000 organizations worldwide.
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For both the TRI and the sustainability reporting, a key goal of the regulation is to make information available to other actors for their use in the marketplace or the political arena. 70 For example, there is evidence that corporations that are comparatively high polluters based on their disclosed TRI data suffer significant stock market declines. 71 With this new information on a firm's environmental performance, investors reacted negatively based on the belief that the data indicated operational inefficiencies, poor management at the firm, or that the disclosure itself will negatively impact the corporation's reputation or lead to tighter environmental regulation. 72 For other actors, such as local interest groups, the TRI data is just one more piece of information to use in their interactions with corporations over the corporation's complex "license to operate." 73 Overall, through mandatory disclosure of information related to a firm's environmental performance, the TRI seeks to achieve new governance goals by empowering the corporation's stakeholders (e.g., community members, consumers, investors) to pressure and work with corporations in an attempt to find workable solutions based on each corporation's specific situation and on current knowledge. Under this system, the government's role is limited to developing and 328-29 (2004) enforcing the requirements of disclosure and not in directly regulating the environmental performance of corporations.
These information-based regulations do have significant limitations. Commentators have labeled the TRI as "moderately effective" 74 because the TRI data fail to capture a firm's total, current environmental performance, including the nature of the environmental and health hazards caused by the listed pollutants. 75 Beyond anecdotal evidence, sustainability reporting has yet to have any demonstrated impact on corporate social performance due to such factors as it being a voluntary program without standardized indicators for reporting. 76 Overall, these deficiencies have made sustainability reports of limited use to investors.
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Both of these programs-and new governance approaches in general 78 -rely on the involvement of third parties for their success. These potential third parties include non-governmental organizations (public interest groups), consumers, commercial partners, financial institutions (e.g., banks and insurance companies), consultants, and institutional investors. 79 As Gunningham and colleagues warn, however, drawing in third parties to assist as surrogate regulators "is a process with many pitfalls and, unless skillfully done, can result in negative rather than positive effects."
80 In this article, I limit my focus to only the potential role of the institutional investor category of public pension funds for improving the environmental and social performance of corporations in a manner that is more effective, efficient, legitimate, and flexible, than the alternative of continually expanding traditional regulatory methods. Pension funds fit into the new governance model by directly impacting corporations through their investment decisions and engagement, and to the extent these actions improve corporate disclosure, they advance the general effectiveness of disclosure-based policies, such as voluntary sustainability reporting. 
Why Harness Public Pension Funds as Surrogate Regulators? 81
Public pension funds are a key institutional investor category in discussions related to LTRI issues for several reasons. First, they lack a conflict of interest with corporations that other institutional investors may have, such as managers of corporate pension funds. 82 This independence makes public pension funds more likely to challenge management on controversial issues. Second, these pension funds are investing to provide retirement benefits for current and future government employees. Thus, they have a strong interest in the long-term return on their investments. Third, due to the increasing size of some of these funds-as of September 2005 there were over 50 public pensions holding over $10 billion in assets 83 -and the fact that their holdings often cover the entire market, some refer to large public pensions as "universal owners," which means that the economywide issues of the nation and the portfolio-wide issues of the pension fund are essentially the same. 84 Thus, whereas managers may not support spending on workforce education or protection of the environment due to the limited direct benefits to their companies, some public pensions will directly capture those benefits to the economy from the increased positive externalities of education and the reduced negative externalities from environmental protection. 85 Although the long-term investing and universal ownership aspects of public pensions have placed them in alignment socially responsible investors (SRI) in some situations, there are significant differences. First, not all universal owner concerns even overlap with long-term investing concerns. For example, although the economy-wide concerns of a universal owner would be appropriate for a fund with indexed investments representing a large share of the market, those concerns are not necessarily appropriate for a long-term investor without such indexed holdings. 86 Second, long-term investors and universal owners 81 The title of this subsection is based on Gunningham et al, supra note 79. The concerns of long-term investors and universal owners do overlap, however, with those SRI investors that believe that these so-called extra-financial issues reduce risk and produce greater returns over the long-term. This form of social investing has evolved from the use of negative screens (e.g., refusing to invest in tobacco companies), to positive screens (e.g., investing in a company because of its positive environmental performance), to engagement with the company. Shareholder engagement with the company-directly or indirectly-is the main role envisioned for public pension funds under this new governance model. As explained further below, it is expected that public pensions' greatest impact will be indirect. Rather than directly engaging with a significant number of corporations, public pensions will have an impact by influencing the engagement practices of their money managers. In addition, any actions they take that influence the production of sustainable investing research and corporate disclosures will benefit other potential actors in the financial and consumer markets, as well as in the political arena.
Public Pension Funds and LTRI: Evaluation of Current Practices
Public pensions are active in LTRI issues in several different ways. First, several public pension funds are currently active in filing shareholder proposals on social and environmental issues (which includes negotiations with corporations to seek an agreement that causes the filer to withdraw the proposal). The most active are the five New York City retirement funds that act collectively through the City Comptroller, who votes proxies on behalf of the funds and directs their shareholder initiatives. 88 Second, pension funds are active through collaborative shareholder groups to push for changes at corporations without filing shareholder proposals and to lobby for regulatory changes. Several public pension funds-CalPERS, CalSTRS, Connecticut Retirement, New York City Employees, New York City Teachers, and New York State Common-belong to the Carbon Disclosure Project. 95 This is an international group of institutional investors that make an annual request for greenhouse gas emissions disclosure from the largest corporations worldwide. 96 Other pensions are involved in more focused projects such as the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System's involvement in a project on the long-term profitability of the pharmaceutical industry. 97 Overall, there seem to be only a limited number of pension funds actively involved in LTRI issues. In addition, these and other funds that purport to be working towards sustainable development may be taking other actions in their investment practices that actually work against it. 105 The next sections discuss the LTRI activities of those pension funds beyond the New York, California, and Connecticut funds described above, and also discuss those activities by pension funds that may actually work against LTRI.
Overview of Public Pension
To understand how public pensions function, it is useful to conduct a brief review of their governance and investment decision-making process. Public pensions are governed by a board of trustees. Board members typically fall into one of three categories based on how they were selected to serve on the board: trustees elected by plan members, ex officio trustees (e.g., state treasurer or city comptroller), and trustees appointed by a government official or committee. The average board has 36% elected trustees, 15% ex officio trustees, and 44% appointed trustees.
106 However, there is wide variation in practice. For example, 28% of public pension boards in one study did not have any member-elected trustees, while 32% had a majority of elected trustees. 107 CalPERS, for example, has 6 elected trustees, 4 ex officio trustees, and 3 appointed trustees. 108 The CalPERS board has responsibility for the funds' investments, but that is not the case for all pension plans. The Florida Retirement System, for example, has its assets managed by the State Board of Administration (SBA). The SBA's board consists of the Governor, the Attorney General, and the State Chief Financial Officer. 109 is an Investment Advisory Council that may comment on investment policy or selection of investment services providers.
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The board of the pension plan or the investment board determines the investment policy (e.g., levels of acceptable risk) and the asset allocations of the plan's assets. Typically, the Executive Director or Chief Investment Officer, as well as an investment consultant, will assist the board in these decisions. After these decisions are made, the pension fund will hire (and then continually monitor) a combination of internal (pension fund staff) and external investment managers to make the actual investments.
LTRI and the Majority of Public Pension Funds
To get a better understanding of what public pensions are doing with respect to LTRI, I conducted a survey of public pension trustees in the fall of 2006. A total of 64 trustees responded to the survey representing 58 different pension systems from 22 different states. These 58 pension funds controlled over $560 billion in assets. They ranged in size from those controlling approximately $20 million to several controlling over $20 billion (the average fund controlled $9.6 billion and the median fund controlled approximately $1.5 billion). In the discussion below, reference to "large" funds means those funds with over $1 billion in assets, and "small" funds are those with under $1 billion. The use of external money managers was common, as 67% of the funds had 100% of their assets managed externally and 79% had over 80% of their assets managed externally. 
Proxy Voting
The minimum level of activity for a pension fund to be a responsible owner is to vote its proxies in an informed manner on social and environmental shareholder proposals. The first step in this process is the development of proxy voting guidelines for use by internal and external money managers. The development of guidelines by pension plans, or at least the awareness of these policies by trustees, 113 is limited. Only 29% of respondents indicated that they 111 In Connecticut, the investment advisory board has 2 ex officio members, 5 appointed members, and 5 union elected members. 113 This survey question asked trustees if the pension had guidelines on the four different issues listed above. They were not provided with the option of selecting "don't know" for this question. Thus, it is possible that a pension plan has voting guidelines on these matters but the responding trustee was not aware of them.
were aware of a policy on corporate governance issues (39% of large funds and only 20% of small funds), 10% on environmental issues (14% of large; 7% of small funds), and 17% on other social issues (29% of large; 7% of small funds). When asked if external managers were provided with clear guidance on how to vote proxies, 53% of respondents responded affirmatively, 35% said "no," and the remaining 12% of funds did not know. Some funds abstain from getting involved in proxy voting at all. For example, one respondent stated that the board has "external managers vote the proxies as they see fit" and another that "we always vote with management." These results are consistent with a recent survey finding that 73% Canadian investment managers "exercised discretion over 85% or more of pension plan client proxies."
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Many commentators point to the influence of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and other proxy advisory firms in determining the success of a shareholder proposal.
115 Some criticize this influence because ISS is an organization without accountability to the pension beneficiaries. 116 In this sample, 26% (33% of large funds) indicated they relied on external advice or guidelines for voting proxies. 117 Approximately half of those indicating that they use an external advisor indicated that they relied, at least in part, on guidelines from ISS.
A review of the largest pension funds' publicly available information provides additional information. Although many pensions (approximately half of the websites I reviewed) do not provide any information on their proxy voting guidelines online, others not only posted guidelines that covered social issues in some detail, but also have their actual votes at each corporation available to the public online (e.g., CalPERS, CalSTRS, Ohio Public Employees, Wisconsin Investment Board). Some pension funds have detailed voting policies on corporate governance issues, but are virtually silent with respect to social issues. Others, such as the Colorado Employees Retirement System, have a detailed policy on corporate governance issues, but have a blanket policy of abstaining on all social issues. 
, available at www.copera.org/pdf/Policy/proxy_voting.pdf ("PERA with Abstain on all social issues, and will only vote on financial issues.") In relation to the discussion in Part II with respect to sustainability reporting, it is interesting to note that several of these funds' proxy guidelines support proposals requiring corporations to provide disclosure on environmental issues. See, e.g., OHIO PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY STATEMENT AND Overall, there is a wide range of practice in the voting of proxies. However, based on my survey results and review of proxy voting guidelines, it seems that most pensions do not take an active role in voting on shareholder proposals on social and environmental issues.
Socially Responsible Investing
The survey also asked pension trustees about "socially responsible investment" practices. This, however, was probably a poor choice of wording given its negative connotation amongst some. 119 Technically, SRI is a widely used practice, as 28% of pensions indicated having some type of investment restriction (negative screen). The most common restrictions were those on investments in "terrorist" nations, 120 124 Others are more specific, such as a police and fire pension fund stating that it would not investment in companies that promote violence against police in music or video games. When asked specifically about an SRI policy, 10% of funds indicated that they had a policy on SRI. However, for at least two of those respondents, that policy was a prohibition against it.
Overall, pension funds are not active in social investing. Although reports on social investing by the Social Investing Forum, for example, claim that public pensions are actively involved in SRI, 125 that does not appear to be the case on a widespread basis or beyond negative screening restrictions imposed by state law on a limited set of issues. In fact, some argue that use of social investing in general-which the Social Investment Forum places at almost one out of every ten dollars under professional management 126 -is significantly overstated. 127 . In addition, it is important to note that these issues that are the basis of existing SRI do little to promote sustainable economic development amongst a large number of corporations.
Impact on Asset Managers
Through their asset managers, public pensions may be furthering the problem of short-termism. Currently, the US lags behind the rest of the world in incorporating extra-financial information into investment decisions. 128 A recent survey of investment managers-including some of the largest managers for US pension funds-found that only 11 percent of respondents believed that 123 129 By contrast, for European, Canadian, and Australian respondents, the affirmative response rate was between 60% and 90%. 130 A follow up survey also found US investment managers to be lower than the global average in believing that climate change, environmental management, human rights, and sustainability, are currently material or will be material within the next five years. 131 Going forward, only one-third of US investment managers expect to see an increase in client demand for the integration of ESG issues into investment practices in the next three years and only one-fifth expect to see clients demand new products based on ESG analysis.
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Public pension funds seem to be doing little to change these expectations of investment managers. Pension funds influence external investment managers' engagement on ESG issues with companies through the managers' selection, their initial contract, their compensation structure, and through regular review meetings. 133 The current message through these four channels is that managers will be rewarded for meeting specific benchmarks or beating their competition.
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Krehmeyer and colleagues note the problem of pension funds evaluating their asset managers on a quarterly basis, which continues the short-termism cycle. 135 In my survey, 70% of the funds review external managers' performance quarterly (19% do annual reviews). This, of course, does not mean that a manager is at risk of being fired for one or two quarters of poor performance, but being evaluated and possibly compensated based on quarterly performance clearly has the potential to focus managers only on short-term investment performance related to the relevant benchmark. 136 In addition, such a process makes it highly unlikely 129 (noting that quarterly reviews in combination with the lack of clear timeframes have the "potential to encourage managers to adopt an investment approach which does not reflect either their clients' wishes or their long-term interests"). An ethnographic study of private and public pension funds for the managers to focus on the long-term, 137 which is necessary for adopting new investment approaches based on environmental and social issues.
138 Without a clear message from pension trustees that consideration of LTRI issues is not simply a "fad" and that money managers will not be punished for a short-term performance short-fall due to the integration of LTRI information into their investment decisions, investment managers will not devote significant resources to these practices. 
Pension Fund Trustees and LTRI: The Hurdles
The survey also asked the trustees to indicate which factors influenced their fund's decision not to engage in SRI. The most common response was that the trustees believed it was not appropriate for them to make investment decisions for the fund based on ethical issues (45% selected this factor). This reflects the association of SRI with ethical investors and not the ESG, LTRI, or extrafinancial criteria investment movement. 140 It also reflects a concern by trustees that consideration of such factors is a breach of fiduciary duties. In fact, two trustees provided a write-in response specifically indicating that concern. The first subsection below addresses those issues.
As for additional factors influencing the decision not to engage in SRI, trustees indicated that they believed SRI would reduce returns (36%), they were not under pressure from the plan membership to develop SRI policies (33%), they lacked of knowledge (22% 141 ), or it was viewed as too expensive (15%). Only two trustees indicated that they did not have an SRI policy because they thought the plan membership would be against it. Among the open-ended responses provided by the trustees, one mentioned "fear of change" by the board. Although only one trustee thought to mention this fear, this concern is reflected in trustees' beliefs about the impact of social investing on returns and their general finds evidence of the challenge of thinking long-term with respect to asset managers (both internal and external) when trustees are barraged with short-term information. WILLIAM M. O'BARR AND JOHN M. CONLEY, FORTUNE & FOLLY: THE WEALTH AND POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING 168-72 (1992) . For example, one interviewee described the process of reviewing asset managers' monthly performance reports but also stating that at their pension fund they "don't try to fire managers over short periods of time." Id at 169. The authors noted the use of the word "try" and wondered how often the interviewee's pension fund was successful in resisting a focus on the short-term. Id. Overall, O'Barr and Conley conclude that "to focus seriously on the long term is an act of intellectual originality that goes against the cultural grain." Id. at 168. 137 Krehmeyer et al., supra note 14, at 9. 138 See infra notes 219-220 and accompanying text. 139 Guyatt, supra note 18, at 143-45. 140 See supra notes 45 & 87 and accompanying text. 141 Only one large pension fund indicated lack of knowledge as factor. knowledge of these practices. These concerns are addressed in the subsection below on conservative decision making by trustees.
Breach of Fiduciary Duties
Trustees may decline to incorporate sustainability factors into their investment practices due to a belief that it would be a breach of their fiduciary duties. The state laws establishing each pension fund typically also state the fiduciary duties of the trustees, which can be categorized as the duties of loyalty and prudence. These duties also exist as common law duties as set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts. With respect to the duty of prudence, state statutes will establish either a prudent person standard (requiring trustees to consider each investment in isolation) or a prudent investor standard (requiring trustees to consider each investment as part of an investment portfolio). 142 The trend is towards adopting the prudent investor standard, 143 as seen by forty-three states having adopted some variation of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA).
144
Included within the duty of prudence is the duty of care, which requires trustees to "to exercise reasonable effort and diligence in making and monitoring investments for the trust." 145 The duty of loyalty requires that the trustees "administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries." Connecticut state law provides that the State Treasurer "may" consider "the social, economic and environmental implications of investments of trust funds in particular securities." 148 The Restatement (Third) of Trusts discusses social investing in its commentaries, but it does not provide a clear statement on its appropriateness under a trustees' fiduciary duties. 149 These comments, however, rely primarily on academic articles discussing trustees' fiduciary duties in the context of social investing based on negative screens-with most of these articles relating to institutional investors divesting from corporations conducting business in apartheid South Africa in the 1980s. 150 As discussed above, social investing may be based either on ethical values or as a strategy to increase value through decreased risk and higher return. 151 Although social investing based on ethical values and the use of negative screening is also likely not a violation of fiduciary duties, 152 an investment strategy based on utilizing environmental and social factors to increase value is clearly not a violation of a trustee's fiduciary duties. 153 In fact, a recent survey of the law by the law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer argues that it would be a violation of fiduciary duties not to consider such issues in certain situations. 154 Social investing may potentially violate the duty of loyalty if investment returns are sacrificed for the primary purpose of providing benefits (social or financial) to a third party, 155 or the trustees are using the plan's assets to further their own political agenda. 156 Both statements need to explanation, however. First, the duty of loyalty is not violated when the purpose of social investing is longterm value creation consistent with the duty of prudence, which is the case with LTRI. 157 In this situation, the benefits accruing to the third parties are not the primary purpose of the investment decision, but are due to the recognition that the proper management of such social and environmental matters may decrease risk and increase value for the corporation (and the pension fund's investment portfolio). Second, it is permissible to consider collateral social benefits when the costs are minimal. In one of the few cases considering social investing by public pension funds, the court in Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement System of Baltimore v. Mayor of Baltimore 158 held that a city ordinance preventing the city pension funds from investing in companies doing business with apartheid South Africa would not cause the trustees to violate their fiduciary duty of loyalty. This ruling was based, in part, on the finding that the costs of such a strategy were de minimis. 159 Third, trustees may act upon "fundamental and generally accepted ethical principles"-which is distinct from a trustee's personal social and political beliefs-and not be in violation of the duty of loyalty or the duty of prudence, 160 which is discussed next.
In Employees' Retirement System of Baltimore, the court also found that the city ordinance did not alter the trustees' duty of prudence. 161 In making this ruling, the court relied on the treatise Scott on Trusts. 162 The court cited Scott for 155 UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 5 comments ("No form of so-called "social investing" is consistent with the duty of loyalty if the investment activity entails sacrificing the interests of trust beneficiaries -for example, by accepting below-market returns -in favor of the interests of the persons supposedly benefited by pursuing the particular social cause"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 reporter's notes comment f (citing with approval the above quote from the Uniform Prudent Investor Act).
156 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 comment c ("in managing the investments of a trust, the trustee's decisions ordinarily must not be motivated by a purpose of advancing or expressing the trustee's personal views concerning social or political issues or causes"). 157 See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
158 562 A.2d 720 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1167 (1990). 159 Id. at 738. 160 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, § 227.17 (4 th ed. 2001). Scott goes on to state that trustees "may consider such matters as pollution, race discrimination, fair employment, and consumer responsibility." Id.
161 Employees' Retirement System of Baltimore, 562 A.2d at 735-38. 162 Id. at 737. the proposition that it is reasonable for a trustee to believe that a more socially responsible corporation will perform better over the long-run. 163 In addition, the court also cited Scott for the idea that regardless of the impact of social performance on financial performance, "the investor, though a trustee of funds for others, is entitled to consider the welfare of the community, and refrain from allowing the use of funds in a manner detrimental to society." 164 This holding was qualified, however, in that it must also only involve de minimis costs, 165 which is not a factor mentioned in Scott. 166 These statements are also consistent with the Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act (UMPERSA) and private pension trustees' fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Both UMPERSA and the Department of Labor state that the consideration of collateral benefits through socially responsible investing is consistent with a trustee's fiduciary duties if the investment has an expected rate of return commensurate to alternative investments of similar risk. 167 Overall, it is clear that the practice of long-term responsible investing with a goal of sustainable economic development would not be in violation of a trustee's fiduciary duties. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer summarize their review of US law by stating that "there appears to be a consensus that, so long as ESG considerations are assessed within the context of a prudent investment plan, ESG considerations can (and, where they affect estimates of value, risk and return, should) form part of the investment decision-making process." 168 The report goes on to form prescriptive guidelines and permissive guidelines. Under prescriptive guidelines, the report states that the duty of prudence requires trustees to treat their proxies as assets and vote on shareholder resolutions in an informed 163 Id. 164 Id. 165 Id. manner, 169 and to consider the relevance of ESG considerations for investment decisions. 170 Under permissive guidelines, the report states that it is not a violation of they duty of loyalty to engage in shareholder activism on ESG issues with the purpose of enhancing company value, or to consider the social and environmental benefits of an investment if the expected rate of return is commensurate to similar investments. 171 The permissiveness of such actions is consistent with the Department of Labor's statement that private pensions should engage in shareholder activism when it is expected to increase investment value. 
Conservative Decision Making
Even if trustees are assured that LTRI would not be in violation of their duties, most pension funds are still unlikely to engage in LTRI due to the trustees' conservative investment decision making practices. Trustees are likely to follow the practices "commonly accepted throughout the investment management industry,"
173 the advice of consultants, and the actions of their peer group. 174 For example, in the UK, 63 percent of pension fund trustees indicated that in making investment decisions their fund "sticks as closely as possible to the accepted practice in the industry." 175 169 See also Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2(1) (1994) (stating with respect to private pensions that "The fiduciary obligations of prudence and loyalty to plan participants and beneficiaries require the responsible fiduciary to vote proxies on issues that may affect the value of the plan's investment"). 170 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, supra note 144, at 114. 171 Id. at 115. 172 Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2(3) (1994).
An investment policy that contemplates activities intended to monitor or influence the management of corporations in which the plan owns stock is consistent with a fiduciary's obligations under ERISA where the responsible fiduciary concludes that there is a reasonable expectation that such monitoring or communication with management, by the plan alone or together with other shareholders, is likely to enhance the value of the plan's investment in the corporation, after taking into account the costs involved. Id.
The issues the Department of Labor lists as possible candidates for shareholder activism include "the nature of long-term business plans, the corporation's investment in training to develop its work force, other workplace practices and financial and non-financial measures of corporate performance." Id. This interpretive bulletin is also cited by the Myners Report in support of greater shareholder activism by pension plans in the United Kingdom. Myners, supra note 136, at 92-93.
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174 Myners, supra note 136, at 59-61. 175 Id. at 59.
Although there is some leadership in LTRI practices, 176 it is far from the commonly accepted practices necessary to change trustee behavior on a large scale. To engage in sustainable investing, trustees will be forced out of their comfort zone. For example, they will need to consider managers using new strategies to incorporate non-financial data into investment analysis. These managers will not have a long track record with these strategies to demonstrate their effectiveness, which will make trustees question the appropriateness of such investments. 177 Likewise, trustees and investment consultants will need to develop new and perhaps untested performance measures to evaluate these managers.
178
This will also pull trustees back towards conventional strategies and push them away from sustainable investing.
Public Pension Disclosure of LTRI Investment Policy and Implementation
In light of the potential for public pensions to serve a useful role under a new governance approach to regulation and considering the currently limited involvement of these funds, public pensions in the US should be required to disclose whether or not LTRI considerations play a role in their investment policies. In addition, pension funds should provide disclosure on the actual implementation of those policies, such as their engagement with corporations, their proxy voting policies, and the basis of their selection and retention of asset managers that utilize an LTRI strategy. 179 Included within the CAFR is an investment section where the pension plan reports on its investment policies, asset allocations, investment activities, and fees. 180 Alternatively, the proposal could be implemented through amendments to the Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act (UMPERSA), which currently requires pension plans to disclose an annual report 176 See supra notes _88-104 and accompanying text. 177 See Clark, supra note 173, at 140 (discussing unconventional investment decisions by trustees in general). 178 See infra notes 218-21 and accompanying text. 179 Calhoun et al., supra note 142, at § 5.5-5.6. 180 Id. at § 5.8.
to the public. 181 Amendments to UMPERSA would have significantly less impact than amendment to GASB Statement No. 15, however, as it would require each state to amend their laws and UMPERSA has apparently not had a significant influence on state laws. 182 As a third alternative, disclosure of LTRI investment policies and implementation actions could be encouraged as a "best practice" by influential organizations such as the Government Finance Officers Association.
183
The remainder of this section reviews the developments surrounding a similar law adopted in the UK and then the expected impact in the US.
UK Pensions of Act of 1995 Disclosure Requirements
Starting in 2000, pension funds (both public and private) in the UK are required by law to disclose in their Statement of Investment Principles (SIP) "the extent (if at all) to which social, environmental or ethical considerations are taken into account in the selection, retention and realisation of investments" and "their policy (if any) in relation to the exercise of the rights (including voting rights) attaching to investments."
184 Note that the law does not require pensions to consider social and environmental issues, but only that the pension provides disclosure on whether or not they do. Similar laws for pension funds exist in Belgium, 185 Germany, 186 and Sweden.
187
The SIP disclosure requirements amendment to the Pensions Act of 1995-along with the recommendations in the well-publicized Myners Report in 2001 that encouraged trustees to be more active owners 188 -has had a significant impact on LTRI shareholder engagement in the UK. A review of actions taken by pensions during the first year of the requirement found that 59% of pensions stated that they were incorporating social and environmental issues into their investments, and 48% indicated that they directed their fund managers to take 181 these issues into account. 189 Fourteen percent of the funds (mostly smaller funds) indicated that they would not take these issues into account, and one-quarter left the decision to their fund managers. 190 The SIP statements, however, rarely mentioned how the policy would be implemented in practice and used language that made it difficult to determine how investment practices would actually change, if at all.
191
In the following years, the disclosure requirements continued to have a significant influence on behavior, but the extent of their actual impact on practices to-date remains somewhat unclear. For example, FairPensions, an NGO sponsored by Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and others, 192 reviewed practices at the 20 largest pension funds in the UK in 2006 and found that only 12 of the 20 actually disclosed whether or not they consider ESG issues in their SIPs. 193 The study claimed that most pensions seemed to take a "box ticking" approach to ESG issues by making general statements in support of responsible investment but not doing anything to implement those statements. 196 When asked which practices the funds used "a lot" for dealing with ESG issues, amongst the large funds-those with over £ 1 billion in assets 197 -4% used negative screening, 16% used positive screening, 58% used engagement, and 50% the exercise of voting rights.
198 For all pensions in the sample, almost onehalf indicated that they would use engagement and voting rights at least "a little 189 197 Id. at 7n.8. 198 Id. at 11. For the smallest funds, they were more likely to use negative and positive screening and less likely to use engagement or voting rights. Id. Pensions for charities were the most likely to use any of these mechanisms. Id. 12.
LTRI Disclosure for Public Pension Funds: A Catalyst for Change
As discussed in Part III, there does not appear to be wide-spread consideration of LTRI issues in public pension investment practices, and some actions may actual work to further the short-termism problem. This article's proposed reforms would not require that public pensions integrate such considerations into their investment policies and practices, but should ensure that the decision whether or not to do so is a fully-informed decision, rather than preempted by concerns over fiduciary duties or stalled due to conservative decision making. This disclosure requirement will establish the legitimacy of LTRI and allay concerns that such actions are in violation of fiduciary duties. This proposal will also raise general awareness of LTRI and allow trustees to observe and learn from the actions of others, which will reduce some of the causes of conservative decision making. Public pensions are free, or course, to state that they do not consider LTRI issues for any reason, such as cost or the belief that it is not in the beneficiaries' best interest. Overall, though, we can expect public pensions to engage in more thoughtful consideration of their policies on shareholder proposals and proxy voting, shareholder engagement, and directly through their investments.
Shareholder Proposals and Voting Policies: As shown earlier, few public pensions have well-developed policies on voting their proxies on environmental and social issues, 206 and only a handful are active in sponsoring shareholder proposals. 207 Although many pensions may (and should) decide to continue not to sponsor shareholder proposals due to the resources required, it is irresponsible of trustees not to have a complete proxy voting policy or to have a blanket policy of abstaining on voting on social and environmental issues. It is well established that proxies are assets of the pension plan and should be voted appropriately. 208 There is an emerging consensus that issues of sustainability will have an impact on investment performance over the long-term 209 and therefore prudent trustees must devote thought to their policies and provide justification for their decisions. In addition, contingent on cost constraints, pensions should make their votes available to the public.
210
Shareholder Engagement. Public pensions can choose to directly engage with corporations individually or act through a coalition of investors, such as the Carbon Disclosure Project 211 or the Investor Network on Climate Risk. 212 Such coalitions operate in different ways. The Carbon Disclosure Project, for example, involves a request filed by institutional investors to corporations to provide disclosure on greenhouse gas emissions and the risks of climate change to the corporation. 213 This information is then available for pensions to use in any direct engagement with the corporation, for their investment managers to use in investment analysis or engagement, and for other interested stakeholders of the corporation. As a member of the Investor Network on Climate Risk, pension trustees can participate in coordinated corporate engagement with other institutional investors. 214 Overall, collaboration allows pension funds to operate more efficiently by reducing duplicate costs, learning from others' experience, and generally increasing their influence. 215 Through these coalitions investors can also engage in the public policy process, such as the efforts of some public pensions to encourage the SEC to require corporations to provide greater disclosure on climate change risks. 216 They can also engage in the policy process by monitoring the political activity of the corporations in which they invest.
217
Investment Practices. For those pension funds that decide to place an increased priority on LTRI issues, we would expect that this would have a significant impact throughout the financial industry because public pensions rely so heavily on investment consultants and external money managers. For example, if pension boards start pressing for action on LTRI practices, then investment consulting firms will start to evaluate money managers on the basis of 210 See infra note 231 and accompanying text (discussing the role of disclosure to reduce the risks of politicalization of the process) 211 Carbon Disclosure Project website, available at www.cdproject.net. 212 engagement and integration of these issues. 218 The consultants will seek investment managers that are trained on these issues and will work to develop compensation and evaluation practices that allow investment managers to undertake engagement based on long-term issues. 219 As discussed earlier, pension funds can also influence external managers' engagement practices through regular review meetings by raising these issues; to the extent these issues are not raised during review meetings, then external managers will provide little attention to them.
220
Through this process, we would expect best practices to develop and to be shared related to pension funds' investment policies and implementation, as well as best practices amongst investment managers on how they demonstrate their effective consideration of LTRI issues and engagement practices to trustees and their consultants. 221 These developments also have the potential to influence sellside analysts' research. This is especially important considering that new financial analysts do not believe there is a demand for consideration of these issues, and therefore do not attempt to gain additional knowledge in this area. 222 The primary 218 Thamotheram, supra note 9, at 300; see also example in the area of analysts' research is the Enhanced Analytics Initiative. 223 This is an initiative that seeks to improve the quality of sell-side analysts' research on LTRI issues through financial incentives. Each member of the initiative, such as a pension fund, agrees to allocate at least five percent of their brokerage commissions to analysts conducting this type of research. 224 The creation of new LTRI research and the pressure for greater corporate disclosure in general will not only improve the decision-making of public pensions' asset managers, but will also further a new governance regulatory approach by creating information of use to others, including social investors, special interest groups, and government bodies.
Preventing the Politicalization of Public Pensions' Policies & Practices
The primary argument against this proposal is that public pensionsthrough the involvement of politicians or union representatives-will simply use LTRI as an excuse to take actions based on private political interests and without actual regard to long-term shareholder value. 225 These arguments-raised most recently as an argument against granting shareholders access to the directors' ballot-echo concerns over economically-targeted investments (ETIs) in the mid1990s. ETIs are investments by pension funds that take into account the investment's economic and social benefits to the local community, such as increased employment or the provision of affordable housing. 226 Some commentators argued that ETIs opened the door to "politicizing" pension investments, as opposed to "maximizing" them. 227 Although some early studies showed that ETIs had a weakly significant negative impact on pension performance, these studies used data before the mid-1990s when the Department of Labor issued a statement that ETIs were appropriate if the expected rate of return was comparable to alternative investments of a similar risk. 228 More recent studies-including those using data after the Department of Labor's announcement-have not found a negative relationship between the use of ETIs and fund performance. 229 Thus, this provides some evidence that encouraging the use of LTRI, with a clear, stated focus on long-term shareholder value, will not simply lead to the politicizing of investments.
In addition, the transparency required-on both policy and implementation-should also work against politicization or domination of decision-making by a special interest group. A pension's LTRI disclosures provide an avenue for dialogue on the pension's policies and performance from both plan members and third parties. Just as unions and special interest groups have started evaluating mutual funds and investment managers on their proxy voting records related to CEO compensation, labor issues, and the environment, 230 pensions' practices will be scrutinized by both those seeking greater consideration of sustainability issues by pensions and those believing that such issues detract from the pension's long-term performance goals. These analyses and discussions should help inform trustees, as well as push them to justify any actions taken (or decisions not to engage in LTRI) to plan members, sponsoring government bodies, and taxpayers. 231 To further prevent politicization-and to improve trustee decision making in general-the governance of public pensions needs greater consideration. 232 First, there should be greater disclosure of conflicts of interest policies, 233 as political donations, for example, have the potential to inappropriately affect investment choices. 234 Second, training and education of board membersespecially member-elected trustees-should become a priority. One trustee of a large fund in my survey stated that "Our board members have a three year term of office and the learning curve is at least two years."
235 Surprisingly, only 14% of the trustees for large pension funds in my survey indicated that the plan had a formal, documented training program. This compared to 39% of smaller funds. Instead, the pension provided a budget for education and trustees obtained their own training on an informal basis. Common training programs attended by trustees included those offered through The Wharton School and Stanford Law School. The disclosure requirement proposed here would likely put LTRI issues on the curriculum of those programs-thus improving general knowledge of these issues-as well as spur research on sustainable development investing by the educators serving in those programs.
Finally, there should be greater consideration of the role of memberelected trustees (including those serving on an Investment Advisory Council). There is some evidence that member-elected trustees can improve fund financial performance (as long as they do not dominate the board) 236 and that they may reduce political interference, such as the sponsoring government using the pension assets as a "safety-valve" against other budget short-falls. 237 Additional research in this area is needed, but such trustees may serve a useful monitoring role. However, there is also the concern that member-elected trustees could lead to the domination of the board by politically-motivated special-interest groups rather than creating a balanced board. For example, the US Chamber of 232 234 Munnell and Sunden, supra note 127, at 36-37; Charles E. Rounds, Jr. supra note 225, at 57. 235 See also Krehmeyer et al., supra note 14, at 17-18 (noting the lack of training for pension trustees).. 236 Hess, supra note 106, at 213-14. 237 Id. at Commerce criticizes CalPERS for being dominated by union-elected member trustees and ex officio trustees that received union funding. 238 The capture of pension fund LTRI practices by politicians and special interest groups is also alleviated by the involvement of external money managers for most public pensions. To the extent that these managers are rewarded and evaluated on their shareholder engagement and the creation of long-term value, they will work with corporations to develop profitable sustainable development strategies, and not simply pressure corporations to improve their environmental and social performance without regard to the economic implications of those acts for the corporation.
Capture is also alleviated if more pension funds are active this area, rather than just the current handful of active pensions. 239 Greater involvement through institutional investor coalitions, the public posting of proxy voting guidelines and investment policies, and in other ways, contributes to the debate and adds new perspectives and balance. Currently, those setting the agenda for shareholder proposals, for example, are religious institutions. 240 This does not necessarily mean that those proposals would not fit within LTRI as described in this article, but increased involvement by a diversity of pension funds will help ensure that the proposals receiving attention from corporations are consistent with LTRI.
Finally, next steps to prevent such capture, as well as further new governance regulatory goals, would be greater participation of state and federal agencies in setting the agenda for shareholder engagement. A current example involves the UK's Health and Safety Executive's (HSE) experiment with the Corporate Health and Safety Performance Index (CHaPSI). 241 CHaPSI is an attempt to develop an index to measure firms' performance and policies related to health and safety management. The HSE developed this index with the input from investors to help ensure that it is useful to them so they will be active in pressuring firms to improve their CHaPSI numbers. 242 could experiment with developing similar programs. Consideration of how to improve the TRI along these lines is a natural starting point. 243 Public pension involvement in these programs would grant legitimacy to this part of their LTRI policy, ensures the pensions are working towards regulatory goals, and, of course, helps provide more effective and efficient regulation.
Conclusion
Traditional legal mechanisms are limited in their ability to regulate corporations' sustainable economic development. Under a new governance approach to regulation that seeks to harness the potential of informed and interested third-party actors to develop flexible and efficient regulation, public pensions can serve a useful role. These pensions have a natural interest in sustainable economic development, but there are hurdles in the way of their greater involvement. To motivate action, and then continually improve the quality of their involvement, public pensions should be required to disclose the extent to which they consider LTRI issues in their investment policies and practices. Public pensions are only one part of this broader, new governance regulatory approach, but they are a potentially powerful catalyst for change. Their actions can spur greater consideration of long-term responsible investor issues throughout the financial industry. In addition, their pressures for increased corporate disclosures on social and environmental issues as part of their LTRI practices will improve information-based regulatory approaches, such as the TRI and sustainability reporting.
